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There are a number of situations in which it is impractical, expensive, unethical, or methodologically deficient to study behavior in its
natural context. Researchers are generally not allowed in the cockpit
of an F-14 to study pilots’ decisionmaking, nor are they allowed to
traumatize some participants (but not others) to determine whether
highly stressful events might be repressed. The legal domain is no
exception, as researchers are generally unable to assign decisionmakers (for example, judges and juries) to experimental conditions or
observe their decisions as they naturally occur. Archival studies overcome some of these limitations, but they present their own set of
problems, such as selective sampling and irremediably confounded
variables.1 The major recourse, as in other arenas of behavioral science, is to conduct simulations.2 Analyses of the field of jury research
* Brian H. Bornstein is Professor of Psychology and Courtesy Professor of Law at
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He received his Ph.D. in 1991 from the University of
Pennsylvania and Master of Legal Studies in 2001 from the University of Nebraska. His
main research interests are jury decisionmaking and eyewitness testimony
** Sean G. McCabe is currently in the J.D.-Ph.D. program at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. He earned his B.Sc. in Neuroscience and Psychology from Dalhousie University in Halifax, Nova Scotia. His research interests include the social and cognitive factors that affect jury performance and damage awards.
Portions of this Article were presented at the International Interdisciplinary Conference
on Psychology & Law, Edinburgh, Scotland (July 2003), and at the Symposium on the Behavioral Analysis of Legal Institutions: Possibilities, Limitations, and New Directions, Tallahassee, Florida (March 2004). We are grateful for the comments of our fellow panelists at
both conferences, and especially to Steve Penrod and Greg Mitchell for their organizational
efforts.
1. See, e.g., Neil Vidmar, Making Inferences About Jury Behavior from Jury Verdict
Statistics: Cautions About the Lorelei’s Lied, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 599 (1994). Vidmar
also highlights the “apples and oranges” problem involved in comparing case types that differ on multiple dimensions as well as other issues that arise in relying on jury verdict reporters as the source of archival data. Id. at 605-06.
2. The pros and cons of simulation methodology generally have been treated else-
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suggest that experimental simulations have been increasing in recent years.3
Simulated trials differ from real trials in a number of respects,
such as the research setting and sample, as well as procedural and
substantive verisimilitude. These limitations have been discussed extensively elsewhere.4 They can be overcome, to some extent, by using
a relatively diverse sample instead of only college undergraduates
and by using relatively realistic materials and judgment tasks.5
However, one limitation seems insurmountable, as it is the sine qua
non of a simulation; namely, no matter how realistic a simulation is,
it is still just a simulation. Simulations can be quite realistic in capturing the verisimilitude of their real-world analog in terms of the
participant sample, the procedure, and other methodological characwhere. See, e.g., Elliot Aronson et al., Experimentation in Social Psychology, in 1 THE
HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 99 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 4th ed. 1998); Ralph
Hertwig & Andreas Ortmann, Experimental Practices in Economics: A Methodological
Challenge for Psychologists?, 24 BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 383 (2001); David O. Sears, College
Sophomores in the Laboratory: Influences of a Narrow Data Base on Social Psychology’s
View of Human Nature, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 515 (1986).
3. See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century,
12 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (2002); Brian H. Bornstein, The Ecological Validity of Jury
Simulations: Is the Jury Still Out?, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 75, 86-87 (1999) [hereinafter
Bornstein, Ecological Validity]; Michael T. Nietzel et al., Juries: The Current State of the
Empirical Literature, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: THE STATE OF THE DISCIPLINE 23, 25-26
(Ronald Roesch et al. eds., 1999).
4. See generally Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3; Robert M. Bray & Norbert L. Kerr, Methodological Considerations in the Study of the Psychology of the Courtroom, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM 287 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray
eds., 1982) [hereinafter Bray & Kerr, Methodological Considerations]; Robert M. Bray &
Norbert L. Kerr, Use of the Simulation Method in the Study of Jury Behavior: Some Methodological Considerations, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107 (1979) [hereinafter Bray & Kerr, Use
of Simulation]; James H. Davis et al., The Empirical Study of Decision Processes in Juries:
A Critical Review, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND
LEGAL ISSUES 326 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J. Levine eds., 1977); Shari Seidman Diamond, Illuminations and Shadows from Jury Simulations, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 561
(1997); Ronald C. Dillehay & Michael T. Nietzel, Constructing a Science of Jury Behavior,
in 1 REVIEW OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 246 (Ladd Wheeler ed., 1980);
Kathleen Carrese Gerbasi et al., Justice Needs a New Blindfold: A Review of Mock Jury
Research, 84 PSYCHOL. BULL. 323 (1977); Nancy J. King, Postconviction Review of Jury
Discrimination: Measuring the Effects of Juror Race on Jury Decisions, 92 MICH. L. REV. 63
(1993); Vladimir J. Konečni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen, External Validity of Research in Legal
Psychology, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 39 (1979); Vladimir J. Konečni & Ebbe B. Ebbesen,
Methodological Issues in Research on Legal Decision-Making, with Special Reference to Experimental Simulations, in PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 413
(Friedrich Lösel et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter Konečni & Ebbesen, Methodological Issues];
Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decision-Making, 244 SCIENCE 1046
(1989); Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions?, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Saks, Jury Experiments];
Wayne Weiten & Shari Seidman Diamond, A Critical Review of the Jury Simulation Paradigm: The Case of Defendant Characteristics, 3 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 71 (1979).
5. It is worth noting, however, that these particular variables—the composition of
the mock juror sample and realism of the mock trial—have little effect on the results of
jury simulation research. See Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3, at 76-84.
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teristics. Nonetheless, the essence of a simulation remains, which is
that participants’ decisions lack real consequences.
Given that these consequences are absent, who would be affected
by them if they were present? Most obviously, the litigants would be
affected. Mock jurors reach a verdict concerning a paper defendant,
who exists solely for purposes of the experiment; but real jurors
make decisions concerning a flesh-and-blood defendant, which could
entail a prison sentence or hefty damage award.6 Somewhat less obviously, there are consequences for the jurors themselves. Mock jurors volunteer to participate in a relatively short study, seldom lasting longer than a couple of hours, which they fit into their daily routine, and for which they are paid or receive course credit. Real jurors
are summoned to appear at a designated time and place, without regard to the needs and demands of their daily lives, to participate in a
trial which might last for weeks, and for which they receive minimal
compensation.
The purpose of this Article is to consider the ramifications of this
distinction, which we refer to as the “consequentiality issue.” Part I
elaborates on the principal questions raised by the issue. Part II presents the courts’ response to jury simulation research. Part III presents researchers’ response to the concerns about consequentiality
and describes research findings on the issue, as well as the limitations of that research. Part IV considers relevant research on related
topics. The comment concludes in Part V with a discussion of possible
alternatives to jury simulation research.
I. QUESTIONS ABOUT SIMULATIONS: IS THE ENTERPRISE ABSURD?
Despite the prevalence of simulation methodology in behavioral
science research more broadly, not just regarding juries, its use has
not gone unquestioned. As Kühberger et al. observed:
It is a remarkable fact about decision research that the use of
imagined situations is accepted as a legitimate means of studying
real decision behavior. In other areas of psychology, such methods
would be considered extremely questionable if not absurd. . . .
Would any psychophysicist be taken seriously who investigated
perceived heaviness not by giving participants actual weights to
lift but by asking participants to imagine lifting a two pound
weight?7
6. This is not at all to suggest that mock jurors are cavalier in their approach. Like
most jury researchers, we have continually been impressed by how seriously most mock jurors take their task. Deliberations involving hypothetical parties can become quite heated.
The question, though, is whether knowing in the back of one’s mind that there are ultimately no real consequences for the parties involved can affect either the process or the
outcome of mock jurors’ reasoning.
7. Anton Kühberger et al., Framing Decisions: Hypothetical and Real, 89
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Kühberger et al. point out that despite this apparent absurdity,
all decisionmaking—even in real situations—is actually hypothetical:
it involves weighing evidence to test hypotheses, considering events
that may or may not obtain, and anticipating feelings we do not yet
have.8 Even real jurors reason in this fashion; for example, if I accept
as true what this witness says, how much does it increase or decrease the probability that the defendant is guilty?9 How would I feel
if I vote to convict the defendant but he really is innocent? So ultimately, in a sense, the disjunction is between thinking hypothetically
about real cases and thinking hypothetically about hypothetical
cases. The crucial distinction is whether the hypothesis-testing process ends in consequences for the parties involved.
Should psycholegal researchers be concerned? The answer, not
surprisingly, is that it depends. In particular, it depends primarily,
perhaps exclusively, on whether real and simulated decisionmaking
differ in either process or outcome. In terms of process, mock jurors,
knowing their decisions lack real consequences, might take their task
less seriously and therefore put forth less effort than real jurors. This
could lead them to process the evidence less systematically or apply
the law inappropriately, thereby denying defendants due process.10
An abundance of research shows that when decisionmakers are “accountable” for their decisions—that is, when they have to justify or
defend them to others—their decisionmaking process is more rational and complex.11 Real jurors—who face the litigants in open
court, answer to the judge, and can be polled afterwards by the attorneys—surely feel accountable; but it is unclear how accountable
mock jurors, who are usually nondeliberating students earning extra
course credit for completing a questionnaire describing hypothetical
parties, would feel.
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 1162, 1162 (2002).
8. Id. at 1163.
9. A number of theorists have explicitly framed jurors’ decisionmaking in such hypothesis-testing terms, often invoking Bayes’ Theorem as a normative model for doing so.
See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, David, Goliath, and Reverend Bayes: Prior Beliefs About Defendants’ Status in Personal Injury Cases, 8 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 233 (1994);
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel N. Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247
(1990).
10. In support of this possibility, dual-process models of decisionmaking distinguish
between “heuristic” and “systematic” processing. The former focuses more on superficial
characteristics of the information and less on content, whereas the latter involves more
cognitive effort and is more content-driven. See generally Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus
Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752 (1980). For a legal application, see Bradley
D. McAuliff et al., Juror Decision-Making in the Twenty-First Century: Confronting Science
and Technology in Court, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY IN LEGAL CONTEXTS 303 (David
Carson & Ray Bull eds., 2d ed. 2003).
11. See generally Jennifer S. Lerner & Philip E. Tetlock, Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255 (1999).
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Regarding outcomes, they could differ in terms of a statistical
main effect—for example, if there were more convictions in simulated
than in real murder trials—or in terms of an interaction, as would be
the case if some substantive or procedural variable exerted a greater
effect in one situation than the other. For instance, pretrial publicity
or expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness memory might
exert a larger effect in simulated than real trials, or vice versa.12 As
several commentators have noted, methodological variables that are
involved in interactions are more problematic, though often more interesting theoretically, than variables that exert main effects.13
The potential for differences between real and simulated jury decisionmaking has both theoretical/psychological and legal/policy implications. From a psychological-theory perspective, a failure to obtain comparable findings in the two settings would compromise the
simulation research’s external validity, which “refers to the extent to
which a particular causal relationship is robust across populations or
settings.”14 The ultimate goal of most psychological research is to discover general principles of behavior; therefore, the discovery of principles that hold true only in limited domains—and artificially contrived ones, at that—has limited utility.15
Although it is true that most psychological research is guided by a
quest for understanding general principles, a great deal of psycholegal research is conducted with the additional goal of using the findings to improve functioning of the legal system.16 Hence the quality of
the research has important legal implications as well, in the sense
that courts and other policymaking bodies, such as legislatures, can
rely on research findings in setting policies regarding jury issues. As
discussed below, the courts are not always receptive to experimental
research, due largely to these same concerns about external validity—that is, the extent to which the research findings have anything
12. We have chosen these particular examples for purely illustrative purposes, though
some suggestive evidence on the pretrial publicity question is provided by Geoffrey P.
Kramer & Norbert L. Kerr, Laboratory Simulation and Bias in the Study of Juror Behavior: A Methodological Note, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1989). Although they did not compare jury decisions with and without consequences, they did find that pretrial publicity effects did not appear to differ as a function of the length and complexity of simulated trials.
Id. at 96-98.
13. See, e.g., Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3, at 78; Bray & Kerr, Methodological Considerations, supra note 4, at 309-13; Saks, Jury Experiments, supra note 4,
at 8.
14. Aronson et al., supra note 2, at 130.
15. Id. See generally Diamond, supra note 4 (discussing examples of limited usefulness of certain simulations).
16. Professor Michael Saks has clearly articulated the relationship between empirical
research and legal policy decisions. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About
the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992);
Saks, Jury Experiments, supra note 4; Michael J. Saks, Legal Policy Analysis and Evaluation, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1110 (1989).
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substantial to say about actual legal contexts. It is, therefore, to the
field’s credit that the experimental methodologies used by researchers are becoming increasingly sophisticated and legally realistic.17
Nonetheless, an experiment is ultimately still an experiment, raising
the issue of whether any simulation can meaningfully speak to realworld legal questions.
II. THE COURTS’ RESPONSE TO SIMULATION
Trial and appellate courts have been presented with social scientific research at least as far back as the famous “Brandeis brief” in
Muller v. Oregon,18 and considerable evidence suggests that the trend
is increasing.19 Such research has been presented in a number of contexts, ranging from desegregation and punitive damages to affirmative action, eyewitness identification, capital punishment, and countless others.20 On the whole, courts have been reluctant to base their
decisions on social scientific data,21 though there are, of course, exceptions.22 The courts’ response to psychological research pertaining
to capital cases (for example, death qualification and instruction
comprehension) is perhaps the most prominent example of judges’ reluctance to rely on experimental simulations.23 In many cases, courts
17. See Diamond, supra note 4; Nietzel et al., supra note 3, at 23-24; William C.
Thompson, Research on Jury Decision Making: The State of the Science, in INDIVIDUAL AND
GROUP DECISION MAKING: CURRENT ISSUES 203 (N. John Castellan, Jr. ed., 1993).
18. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
19. For a brief history of social science in the law, see generally MARK COSTANZO,
PSYCHOLOGY APPLIED TO LAW 1-30 (2004); JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL
SCIENCE IN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 1-29 (4th ed. 1998); Blumenthal, supra note 3;
Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Julius G. Getman, Social Science in Legal Decision-Making, in LAW
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 581 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986); and Phoebe C.
Ellsworth & Robert Mauro, Psychology and Law, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 2, at 684.
20. A comprehensive listing of cases involving social scientific data is beyond the
scope of the present Article. For representative cases, see the following: Gratz v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 244, 298-300 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (regarding affirmative action);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330-31 (2003) (regarding benefits of affirmative action);
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (regarding punitive damages; although the Court’s decision did not cite social scientific research, jury researchers
submitted amici curiae on behalf of both plaintiff and defendant); Lockhart v. McCree, 476
U.S. 162, 168-71 (1986) (regarding capital punishment); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S.
483, 494 n.11 (1954) (regarding desegregation); United States v. Hudson, 884 F.2d 1016,
1023-24 (7th Cir. 1989) (regarding eyewitness identification). For general reviews, see
Blumenthal, supra note 3; MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 19; and Mark I. Satin, Law
and Psychology: A Movement Whose Time Has Come, 1994 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 581, 600-02.
21. See, e.g., MONAHAN & WALKER, supra note 19; J. Alexander Tanford, The Limits of
a Scientific Jurisprudence: The Supreme Court and Psychology, 66 IND. L.J. 137, 138
(1990) (indicating that the Supreme Court has not welcomed research on jury behavior).
22. See Diamond, supra note 4, at 569; Tanford, supra note 21, at 138.
23. See, e.g., James R. Acker, A Different Agenda: The Supreme Court, Empirical
Research Evidence, and Capital Punishment Decisions, 1986-1989, 27 L AW & S OC’Y
REV. 65 (1993); Diamond, supra note 4, at 567-69; Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Unpleasant
Facts: The Supreme Court’s Response to Empirical Research on Capital Punishment, in
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reviewing death sentences have discounted experimental social scientific findings due to various perceived methodological shortcomings
of the research;24 yet in a number of cases, one of the supposed shortcomings was the simulated nature of the research itself.
For example, in Free v. Peters the Seventh Circuit considered the
results of a jury simulation that assessed mock jurors’ comprehension of death penalty instructions.25 Among other shortcomings of the
study, the court opined that “[t]he first [fatal flaw] is lack of comparability between the test setting and the setting of the sentencing
hearing.”26 In other words, participants in the test setting were deficient because they did not set real sentences. The Missouri Supreme
Court reached a similar conclusion in another capital case, State v.
Deck.27 The court rejected experimental data showing that penalty
phase instructions were poorly understood, concluding:
[The] study, however, must be discounted because the people interviewed for the study did not act as jurors. They were given hypothetical facts that were different than the facts in this case, and
they did not hear the testimony of witnesses, observe physical evidence or deliberate with eleven other jurors.28

The capital case that has received the most commentary in this
respect is Lockhart v. McCree, in which Justice Rehnquist, writing
for a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court, harshly criticized several
jury simulations that purported to show that death-qualified juries
were conviction-prone.29 Among other failings (for example, lack of
deliberation), the Court identified the lack of consequences flowing
from the decision as a major factor undermining the studies’ implicaCHALLENGING CAPITAL P UNISHMENT: LEGAL AND S OCIAL S CIENCE APPROACHES (Kenneth C. Haas & James A. Inciardi eds., 1988); Tanford, supra note 21, at 144-48; cf.
Konečni & Ebbesen, Methodological Issues, supra note 4, at 416-18 (criticizing the
California Supreme Court’s openness toward death-qualification voir dire simulations
in true capital-case context and approving of the U.S. Supreme Court’s conclusion that
the research in that area should not be relied upon).
24. See generally sources cited supra note 23. This reluctance to adjudicate based
on experimental evidence applies not merely to social scientific research, but to experimental data more broadly. Such evidence is often criticized as being too abstract
and impersonal to bear on particular case facts, despite its relevance in a technical
sense. E.g., In re “Agent Orange” Product Liability Litigation, 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1241
(E.D.N.Y. 1985). More generally, it reflects a preference for case-specific information
over aggregate data. See, e.g., Brian H. Bornstein, The Impact of Different Types of
Expert Scientific Testimony on Mock Jurors’ Liability Verdicts, 10 PSYCHOL. CRIME &
L. 429 (2004). A consideration of other types of experimental data is beyond the scope
of the present Article; the focus here is on social/cognitive psychological experimentation.
25. 12 F.3d 700, 705 (7th Cir. 1993).
26. Id.
27. 994 S.W.2d 527 (Mo. 1999).
28. Id. at 542.
29. 476 U.S. 162, 168-73 (1986). There is sizable literature critiquing the Court’s
reasoning in Lockhart. See sources cited supra note 20.
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tions: “[I]ndividuals . . . were not actual jurors sworn under oath to
apply the law to the facts of an actual case involving the fate of an
actual capital defendant.”30
These selected cases should not be taken to imply that the courts
are invariably hostile to simulation research. Some courts, in a variety of cases, have been quite receptive to simulation research.31
Nonetheless, the cases discussed in the preceding paragraphs are a
fair representation of appellate courts’ general reluctance to base decisions on simulation research, particularly on grounds of external
validity.
III. RESEARCHERS’ RESPONSE TO THE CONSEQUENTIALITY QUESTION
For the most part, researchers have turned a blind eye to the
consequentiality issue, within both psychology in general and psycholegal research in particular.32 It has been alluded to in critiques of
jury research, but overlooked in favor of more researchable problems,
such as who the mock jurors are or characteristics of the mock trial.33
These studies—which tend to find few differences as a function of
simulations’ methodological characteristics—have focused on the
quality of simulations, rather than simulations qua simulations.34 A
large part of the reason for this avoidance of the consequentiality issue is, no doubt, the fact that it is a notoriously intractable research
question. A variety of research approaches exist, each with significant limitations.
A. Possible Research Approaches
There are essentially three possible research approaches, each
fraught with logistical or ethical complications. First, one could
lead mock jurors to believe their decisions have consequences in
situations where they really have no consequences. Although such
a procedure raises the ethical issue of deception, it does not exceed
the degree of deception that is commonplace, and generally ethi-

30. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 171 (emphasis added).
31. As Diamond points out, “[I]n a post-Daubert world, [courts] are paying more
attention to scientific evidence of all kinds.” Diamond, supra note 4, at 569 (citation
omitted).
32. In making this assertion, the authors do not exempt themselves and have
even defended simulation methodology elsewhere. See, e.g., Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3. There are also several notable exceptions. See generally Aronson
et al., supra note 2; Sears, supra note 2. Among jury researchers, Professor Shari
Diamond has perhaps paid the greatest attention to the consequentiality issue. See
Diamond, supra note 4; see also Weiten & Diamond, supra note 4.
33. See, e.g., Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3; Nietzel et al., supra
note 3.
34. See sources cited supra note 33.
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cally acceptable, in social psychological research.35 However, as a
practical matter, it is difficult to convince research participants—
who are often fairly savvy psychology undergraduates—that the
research means what the experimenter says it means. It would be
especially difficult to persuade participants in a psychology research laboratory that they are making decisions about a defendant who is merely shown on videotape or described in a written
summary, which are the most commonly used simulation media.36
For this sort of dissimulation to have even a chance of success, the
trial would need to be conducted live in an actual courthouse, or it
would need to involve a dispute resolution context where it was
plausible that undergraduates in a laboratory setting would be
making real decisions. The former approach is difficult, timeconsuming, and expensive; the latter approach, though attempted
with some success in the studies described below, is also quite
complicated and strains participants’ credulity.
Second, one could lead real jurors to believe their decisions do
not have consequences in situations where they really do. It is
hard to imagine a judge who would condone leading some jurors to
believe they were making mere hypothetical decisions, for the
sake of comparison to other jurors who believed they were making
consequential decisions, only to implement those decisions after
the fact in both conditions. Such a procedure would adequately
address the research question, and it would be fairly easy to implement experimentally; but it is so blatantly unethical and unjust
that it hardly warrants serious consideration.37
Third, one could randomly, or quasi-randomly, assign participants to conditions that differ solely in their consequences: really
real versus really hypothetical. For example, one group of participants would review a set of case facts under simulation assumptions, while another group would review the same case facts
but make a consequential decision. 38 This approach is expensive
35. See Aronson et al., supra note 2, at 135-37. For the American Psychological
Association’s guidelines regarding deception, see AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, ETHICAL
PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT, Ethical Standard 8.07, reprinted in
57 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1060, 1070 (2002), available at http://www.psycinfo.com/psycarticles
/2002-11464-006.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2004).
36. Bornstein, Ecological Validity, supra note 3, at 86.
37. It is also quite possibly illegal. With very few exceptions (for example, the occasional investigative TV journalism report), jurors cannot be observed while performing their task. Because of fair-trial concerns, experimental manipulations involving
juries are quite rare, and those that have been tried involve much less controversial
procedures. See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text. A manipulation that varies
the whole essence of the jury’s task, though intriguing from a scientific perspective,
could never be implemented.
38. A study by Shari Diamond and Hans Zeisel that compared the decisions of actual and shadow juries comes closest to this sort of comparison. See Shari Seidman
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and time-consuming, as it involves having the hypothetical decisionmakers sit through an entire trial, so that their experience is
the same as the real decisionmakers except for the consequences
of their decision. And even so, it is difficult to match their experiences completely: real jurors interact with each other, and
with courtroom personnel (lawyers and the judge), in ways that
shadow jurors would not. Finally, because the deliberations of
real jurors are ordinarily off-limits to researchers, as noted
above, one could compare the two groups on outcome but not on
process.
B. Research Findings on the Consequentiality Question
Perhaps because of these myriad difficulties in conducting the
research, we could find only five jury simulation studies that conducted a direct test of the consequentiality question (see Table 1,
infra).39 Most of these studies were conducted during the mid to
late 1970s, which qualifies as the “heyday” of consequentiality research. It is indeed odd that more recent research has not been
conducted, as the question was hardly resolved by this small
flurry of activity twenty to thirty years ago. Unfortunately, these
studies provide no consensus about the effects of consequentiality
on jurors’ decisions. One study found that convictions were less
likely when the decision had real consequences,40 one study found
that convictions were more likely when the decision had real consequences,41 one study found no difference between real and hypothetical decisions,42 and the two remaining studies found no main
effect of consequentiality but obtained interacting effects with
other variables.43

Diamond & Hans Zeisel, A Courtroom Experiment on Juror Selection and DecisionMaking, 1 P ERSONALITY & S OC. P SYCHOL. BULL. 276 (1974). This study is described in
more detail in Part III.B.
39. In chronological order, the studies were conducted by Diamond & Zeisel,
supra note 38; David W. Wilson & Edward Donnerstein, Guilty or Not Guilty? A
Look at the “Simulated” Jury Paradigm, 7 J. A PPLIED S OC . P SYCHOL . 175 (1977);
Norbert L. Kerr et al., Role Playing and the Study of Jury Behavior, 7 S OC .
M ETHODS & R ES . 337 (1979); David Suggs & John J. Berman, Factors Affecting
Testimony About Mitigating Circumstances and the Fixing of Punishment, 3 L AW
& H UM . B EHAV . 251 (1979); and Martin F. Kaplan & Sharon Krupa, Severe Penalties Under the Control of Others Can Reduce Guilt Verdicts, 10 L AW & P SYCHOL .
R EV . 1 (1986).
40. Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 38, at 276-77.
41. Wilson & Donnerstein, supra note 39, at 185.
42. Kerr et al., supra note 39, at 348.
43. Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 39, at 8-13; Suggs & Berman, supra note 39, at
256.
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TABLE 1
STUDIES MEASURING THE EFFECT OF CONSEQUENTIALITY ON
JUROR/JURY DECISIONS
MAIN EFFECT OF
CONSEQUENTIALITY

INTERACTING
EFFECTS

DELIBERATION

Field

More guilty verdicts
for mock juries than
real juries

No

Yes

Wilson &
Donnerstein (1977)

Laboratory

More guilty verdicts
for “real” jurors than
hypothetical jurors

No

No

Kerr et al.
(1979)

Laboratory

No main effect of
consequentiality

No

Yes

Suggs &
Berman
(1979)

Laboratory

No main effect of
consequentiality

Yes

No

Kaplan &
Krupa
(1986)

Laboratory

No main effect of
consequentiality

Yes

No

STUDY

SETTING

Diamond &
Zeisel
(1974)

An early field study by Shari Diamond and Hans Zeisel looked
specifically at differences between the verdicts of real and experimental juries.44 In an experiment designed to examine the effect of
peremptory challenges during voir dire on jury composition and verdict, they arranged for three separate juries, one actual and two experimental, to hear one of ten criminal cases in the Northern District
of Illinois.45 The first experimental jury, the “English jury,” consisted
of a random sample of jurors from the pool who were not selected or
questioned by the attorneys.46 A second experimental jury, the “challenged jury,” was made up of those jurors who were removed after
peremptory challenges by either the prosecution or defense;47 these
jurors did not know which side had excused them, as all challenges
were submitted on special forms.48 All the jurors were treated simi44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 38, at 276.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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larly during the trials; they were present in the courtroom during the
entire trial, they were paid the standard juror fee, and they all deliberated in separate rooms before reaching a verdict.49 However, the
real jurors knew that they were deciding on an actual verdict,
whereas the experimental jurors knew that their decisions would
have no effect on the defendant.50
Over the series of ten trials, the results revealed a tendency toward more convictions for the experimental juries than for the real
juries.51 This suggests that jurors on the real juries may have used a
higher standard for conviction than experimental juries who knew
that their decisions would have no consequences for the defendants.
While this early study has been critiqued for a number of reasons,52 it
still suggests that important variables to consider in mock-jury research are the role-playing ability of experimental jurors and
whether simulations can adequately represent the same decisionmaking processes of real jurors.
While the results of the Diamond and Zeisel experiment suggested
a trend toward more guilty verdicts by jurors who were aware of the
experimental nature of their task, a later study produced results indicating the opposite.53 To test the effect of consequentiality, Wilson
and Donnerstein designed a series of studies in which a student was
accused of stealing an exam and distributing the questions.54 The
student was tried in the context of a student judicial hearing.55 The
researchers manipulated the character and physical attractiveness of
the defendant,56 but more importantly, participants were informed
either that they were taking part in an experimental trial or that the
trial was real and would have actual consequences for the student.57
The results showed that jurors in the real-consequences condition arrived at significantly more guilty verdicts than those in the hypothetical-consequences condition.58 In addtion, jurors who thought
they were participating in an actual trial recalled more of the trial
evidence,59 which suggests that consequentiality can affect the decisionmaking process as well as the outcome.
Kaplan and Krupa’s results also suggested higher conviction rates
when participants believed they were participating in a real trial, but
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation, supra note 4; Kerr et al., supra note 39.
Wilson & Donnerstein, supra note 39, at 185.
Id. at 179.
Id.
Id. at 174, 182, 184.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 185.
Id. at 186.
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only under some circumstances.60 They were primarily interested in
how the severity of the penalty would affect jurors’ decision to convict, as well as how penalty severity might interact with the reality
of the consequences. The authors reasoned that because the severity
of the criminal convictions in the Diamond and Zeisel study was
high, in comparison to the less severe consequences of stealing an
exam in the Wilson and Donnerstein study, the severity of the case
might determine the effects of consequentiality.61 To test this hypothesis, Kaplan and Krupa designed an experiment where students
were asked to judge the guilt of a fellow student who was accused of
cheating.62 The independent variables were the following: the
strength of evidence against the defendant;63 whether the jurors
themselves or an authority would select the punishment; the possible
penalty for conviction, which ranged from mild to moderate or from
moderate to severe; and whether students were led to believe that
their decisions were real and binding or part of an experimental
simulation.64
There was a main effect for strength of evidence, such that when
there was strong evidence of guilt, jurors were more likely to convict,
without any interacting effects with the other variables.65 However,
when the evidence of guilt was low and the punishment was controlled by the students, the researchers found that those who were
led to believe their decisions had real consequences were more likely
to convict than those who made hypothetical decisions.66 Kaplan and
Krupa suggested that these results may have differed from Diamond
and Zeisel’s results because, in the present study, the jurors were
judging other students in a case they had direct personal involvement with: cheating on an exam they had all taken.67 The students
might have adopted a lower conviction criterion and a stronger presumption of guilt when there was a chance someone could have gotten away with not writing the exam they all had to write.
While the research by Kaplan and Krupa suggests a possible explanation for the different results between the Diamond and Zeisel
and the Wilson and Donnerstein studies, two other studies that
investigated consequentiality found yet other constellations of

60. Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 39, at 8-13.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. at 3-4.
63. Id. at 3. The authors reasoned that when evidence points more clearly to guilt, it
should be more difficult to deny the guilt of the defendant merely because a conviction entails severe consequences. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 11.
66. Id. This result was obtained regardless of the level of punishment. Id. at 12.
67. Id. at 13.
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results.68 Kerr et al. also examined the effect of role-playing on juror
verdicts by comparing the responses of “actual” and “hypothetical”
juries in an experimental student discipline case.69 The researchers
created a hypothetical case involving a student charged with “malicious destruction of University property” at a nearby campus who,
because of tremendous publicity, had been granted a change of
venue.70 Participants in the “actual jury” were led to believe that
the school was experimenting with a new method of student discipline and that they would receive course credit for their participation in the student’s trial.71 To boost the trial’s realism, a confederate, posing as a participant, was excused from the trial after indicating she was at the other campus in the past year and had read
about the case in the school newspaper.72 Another confederate,
dressed in coat and tie, had been introduced as the cochairman of
the University Committee on Student Discipline and reminded the
students of the importance of their task.73 Participants in the “mock
jury” were to place themselves in the role of jurors and decide a
previously tried case that would have no actual consequences.74 All
participants were given transcripts of the case and completed questionnaires both prior to and following deliberation.75
Results of the study suggested that there were no significant differences between individual and group verdicts of the two juries.76
There was also a failure to find differences for sentence recommendation, deliberation time, and reasonable doubt criterion.77 As well,
prior to deliberation both groups indicated that they clearly understood their roles and the importance of their decision for the defendant.78 The authors argued that these results should increase our
confidence that mock juries can reliably be utilized in jury behavior
research.79
Finally, a study by Suggs and Berman provided mixed support for
the use of mock juries.80 In an experiment designed to investigate the
effect of mitigating testimony on mock-juror decisions, the researchers included a real-world consequentiality variable to enrich the ex-

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

See Kerr et al., supra note 39; Suggs & Berman, supra note 39.
Kerr et al., supra note 39, at 341-42, 345.
Id. at 342-43.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343-44.
Id. at 343.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 344-45.
See id. at 347-48.
See id.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 351.
See Suggs & Berman, supra note 39.
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ternal validity of the results.81 Participants in the “no-consequence”
condition were informed that they were being given a hypothetical
plagiarism case in order to investigate student attitudes toward
cheating.82 Those in the “some-consequence” condition were told that
the department chair had been confronted with a plagiarism case
and wanted student input about appropriate action.83 Additionally,
they were informed that while their opinions would be carefully considered, there was no guarantee that they would be the deciding factor in the case.84 The researchers also manipulated the presence of
mitigating testimony, its source (defendant or third party), and its
credibility (high versus low).85
Overall, there was no difference between participants in the noand some-consequence conditions in their assignment of penalties.
However, the pattern of results for the other variables was affected
by consequentiality. When participants believed their decisions
might have some consequence, less severe penalties were given when
mitigating testimony for the defendant was presented (regardless of
its source) than when it was not.86 However, for participants whose
decisions had no consequence, none of the other variables produced
any reliable difference.87 The researchers concluded that fears about
the differences between real-world and role-playing behaviors among
jurors may be well founded.88
C. Limitations of the Extant Studies
The results of the above studies provide little general consensus
about the effect of role-playing and consequences on jury behavior.
While a few studies provide support for those who criticize the external validity of experimental jury simulations, the studies themselves
fall victim to methodological criticisms. First of all, it is important for
any study investigating the effect of role-playing on juror behavior to
manipulate the consequentiality variable successfully and be certain
participants believe the cover story. If participants who are led to believe they are hearing an actual trial have doubts about its reality or
the consequences their decisions will have on the defendant, then it
makes little sense to liken their behavior to that of real jurors. In the
study by Wilson and Donnerstein, the students participated in the
study to receive extra credit in a psychology course.89 Critics of this
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 254-55.
Id. at 255.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 254-55.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 258-59.
Id. at 260.
Wilson & Donnerstein, supra note 39, at 178.
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study note that it seems quite likely that the “real” jurors, expecting
to participate in a psychological experiment, would doubt the reality
of their task.90 Unfortunately, Wilson and Donnerstein reported no
data measuring the effectiveness of their cover story.91
Following the verdict responses of their participants, Kaplan and
Krupa asked for their comments, concerns, or feelings about the procedure in order to assess its credibility.92 Only three participants
showed an awareness of the deception and were eliminated from the
sample.93 However, the authors failed to state exactly how these responses were elicited. If participants were indeed just asked to write
any general “comments, concerns, or feelings” rather than asked specifically about the importance of the trial’s consequences, it might be
that not all instances where the cover story failed were identified.
Suggs and Berman did explicitly measure the effectiveness of
their consequentiality manipulation for participants in the someconsequence condition, but they did not find particularly satisfying
results. These participants were specifically asked if they doubted
that the case was real; 30% answered that they had no doubt, 53%
reported some doubt, 15% reported strong doubt, and 1% were convinced it was not a real case.94 The participants were also asked
whether they had doubts that their opinions would have any impact
on the final decision, and 64% said yes.95 Again, students volunteered
for the study in order to fulfill course requirements, which may have
tipped them off as to the simulated nature of the case.
Noting the importance of the consequentiality manipulation, Kerr
et al. sought to manipulate it effectively by creating a mock trial that
was as realistic as possible.96 All participants were recruited to participate in a vaguely worded “Jury project.”97 Because the student
participants expected to receive course credit for their participation,
the researchers assumed that most would expect the jury project to
be some sort of experiment.98 For this reason, they used confederates
and other props to enhance the credibility of the cover story.99
Kerr et al. also checked for participant suspicion of the experimental manipulation. Of 108 “actual” jurors, seven indicated some
misunderstanding or suspiciousness of the cover story in their writ90.
339.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation, supra note 4, at 113; Kerr et al., supra note 39, at
See Wilson & Donnerstein, supra note 39.
Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 39, at 7.
Id.
Suggs & Berman, supra note 39, at 256.
Id.
See Kerr et al., supra note 39.
Id. at 341.
Id.
Id.
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ten remarks, but they also indicated that they treated the case as
genuine in case their suspicions were without merit.100 Also, predeliberation questionnaires indicated that actual jurors clearly believed
their verdicts would have consequences for the defendant and felt
that their decisions were significantly more important for the defendant than did the mock jurors.101
Another limitation of these studies is that only two of the five included jury deliberations, an extremely important part of the adversarial process. A lack of jury deliberation in experimental studies has
been identified as one of the major threats to external validity and
policy relevance.102 Despite the frequent suggestion that jury verdicts
are essentially determined by the distribution of verdict preferences
prior to deliberation,103 there is reason to believe that deliberation
can influence jury outcomes in certain situations. A recent metaanalysis of research that investigated deliberating juries between
1955 and 1999 argues that in one out of ten trials, deliberation results in a reversal of the verdict preference initially favored by the
majority;104 given the large number of jury trials each year, a substantial number of trial outcomes could therefore hinge on the deliberation process. Other than the field experiment by Diamond and
Zeisel, the only laboratory study of consequentiality that included deliberation was the study by Kerr et al.; but even then, the deliberations were limited to forty-five minutes.105 With unlimited time, dissenting members of hung mock juries might be more willing to acquiesce than those in the “actual” juries, due to the differential importance of reaching a final decision in the two conditions.106
Because of the difficulties associated with trying to manipulate
experimentally mock jurors’ perceptions of the consequences of their
decisions, a more effective method might be to eliminate the consequentiality manipulation and use shadow juries during actual trials,
as was done by Diamond and Zeisel.107 However, this field method is
not without its own limitations. The small number of cases and lack
of experimental control over potentially confounding variables, such
100. Id. at 346.
101. Id. at 347.
102. E.g., Diamond, supra note 4, at 564-65; Weiten & Diamond, supra note 4, at 7879.
103. E.g., REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 169-71 (1983); HARRY KALVEN, JR. &
HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966).
104. Dennis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on
Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 622 (2001). Factors suggested by the
meta-analysis for how deliberation may affect the verdict outcome include the deliberation
style (evidence or verdict-driven), polling methods, and the collectively accepted interpretation of instructions.
105. Kerr et al., supra note 39, at 344.
106. Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation, supra note 4, at 114.
107. Diamond & Zeisel, supra note 38, at 276.
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as the juror selection procedure, make the results of the Diamond
and Zeisel study difficult to assess as well.108
Finally, all of these studies involved criminal or quasi-criminal offenses. Consequentiality might have different effects in civil trials,
where the outcomes usually involve monetary damages instead of
criminal sanctions, such as imprisonment or other penalties (for example, failing a class or expulsion in the student honor-code-violation
cases), and where a unanimous decision rule is less common.
IV. OTHER RELEVANT RESEARCH
An inspection of these studies leaves unresolved the question
whether mock jurors behave similarly to actual jurors when they are
aware that their decisions have no real consequences. In addition,
the amount of deception necessary for effective consequentiality manipulations makes it very difficult to perform research on the consequentiality of jury decisions. Because of these inconsistencies and
limitations, it is helpful to review other bodies of research to see if
results from analogous experiments can be used either to support or
undermine the use of mock trials in studying juror behavior. Relevant research exists within the jury research domain as well as from
research on decisionmaking in nonlegal contexts.
A. Within the Legal/Jury Domain
As mentioned in Part III, Kaplan and Krupa suggested that it is
important to include considerations of penalty severity when investigating consequentiality.109 Intuitively, this makes sense: if we are
considering the consequences that a jury’s decisions (that is, some
versus none) will have on a defendant, then the magnitude of those
consequences (small versus large) might be expected to operate in an
analogous fashion.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of willingness to convict
in death penalty cases in Witherspoon v. Illinois110 and later in Lockhart v. McCree,111 indicating the Court’s concern with the impact of
penalty severity on jurors’ decisions. If jurors are assumed to focus
on avoiding false convictions of innocent people, then the greater the
penalty severity, the greater the perceived cost of error. As this perceived cost of error increases, jurors should require more evidence of
guilt before voting to convict. With this shift in criterion, jurors

108.
338.
109.
110.
111.

Bray & Kerr, Use of Simulation, supra note 4, at 113; Kerr et al., supra note 39, at
Kaplan & Krupa, supra note 39.
391 U.S. 510 (1968).
476 U.S. 162 (1986).
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should therefore be less likely to vote guilty when the penalty is more
severe.112
The idea that more severe penalties lead to less willingness to
convict is not new to the experimental arena. For example, an early
study by Vidmar found that when mock jurors were presented with
several different guilt decision alternatives (each carrying a mandatory sentence), the highest number of not-guilty verdicts came from
the condition with only two extreme alternatives (not guilty or first
degree murder) as opposed to conditions with several or less extreme
levels of guilt.113 Similar studies varying the latitude and severity of
possible sentences offered to mock jurors have also found evidence
suggesting that larger potential penalties lead to fewer convictions.114
However, Freedman and his colleagues argue that because the design of these studies did not vary the available evidence for different
charges of guilt, even though the law often requires additional evidence to prove more serious charges than less serious ones, jurors
were essentially forced to vote not guilty for the more serious
charges.115 In their own research, Freedman et al. equated the evidence required for guilt for all charges and found no indication that
mock jurors were less likely to vote guilty when penalties were relatively severe.116 Thus, the extent to which penalty severity can serve
as a useful analog for consequentiality is unclear.117
The underlying premise of this line of research is that the relationship between no consequence and some consequence is the same
as the relationship between a small consequence and a large consequence. Is this a reasonable analogy? If so, then the difference between no jail time and six months imprisonment should be the same

112. Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty and Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, 36 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1431, 1431-32 (1978).
113. Neil Vidmar, Effects of Decision Alternatives on the Verdicts and Social Perceptions of Simulated Jurors, 22 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 211, 211 (1972).
114. See, e.g., Kalman J. Kaplan & Roger I. Simon, Latitude and Severity of Sentencing
Options, Race of the Victim and Decisions of Simulated Jurors: Some Issues Arising from
the “Algiers Motel” Trial, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 87, 90, 96 (1972).
115. Jonathan L. Freedman et al., Severity of Penalty, Seriousness of the Charge, and
Mock Jurors’ Verdicts, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 189, 191 (1994).
116. Id. at 189.
117. In response to the Freedman et al. study, Kaplan criticized the research for,
among other reasons, failing to address the consequences of conviction for the defendant or
society. Martin F. Kaplan, Setting the Record Straight (Again) on Severity of Penalty: A
Comment on Freedman et al., 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 697, 697 (1994). Further, Kaplan argued that rather than negate the effect of penalties, the research findings as a whole set
limits on the penalty-severity effect and support the possibility of a criterion shift due to
penalty. See id. at 698. The crucial variable, according to Kaplan, is whether the jurors believe the decision involves real consequences. See id. For a continuation of this debate, see
Jonathan L. Freedman, Penalties and Verdicts: Keeping the Record Straight, 18 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 699 (1994), and Martin F. Kaplan, Keeping the Record Complete, 18 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 702 (1994).
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as the difference between six and twelve months imprisonment.118 Although that pattern might correspond well to people’s perceptions, it
is also possible that there is a discontinuity between no penalty and
any penalty, in much the same way that there is a discontinuity between a lengthy prison term and the death penalty.119
B. Other Domains
The debate over the use of hypothetical situations to study human decisionmaking is not limited to the legal domain. It is a
widely accepted practice to use hypothetical situations when investigating judgment and decisionmaking in a variety of contexts.120 As with jury decisionmaking, researchers in these fields
have occasionally (though also surprisingly seldom) considered the
difference between decisions made with hypothetical versus real
consequences.121
One research area in particular that has found a need for the
use of hypothetical situations is the domain of risk-taking behavior. A common approach in this area is to study how people behave when faced with a risky situation, such as a hypothetical
gamble, that can be framed in a number of different ways. Because of the dependency on hypothetical situations in this research, its validity has often been questioned, which has led to
research comparing real and hypothetical decisionmakers. 122
Mirroring the inconsistent findings on consequentiality in the
jury simulation literature, this research has found that people
make riskier decisions when real consequences are used,123
118. The analogy holds even if length of imprisonment is perceived as a nonlinear scale.
119. Another way of expressing it is that the extreme alternatives—no consequences at
all at one end of the continuum and capital punishment at the other end—are qualitatively
different from the range of alternatives, such as prison sentences of varying duration, that
comprise the large middle of the continuum. If so, then comparing some-penalty versus nopenalty involves comparing apples and oranges, whereas comparing more versus less severe penalties involves comparing apples of different sizes.
120. For a general overview of research on judgment and decisionmaking, see JONATHAN
BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING (3d ed. 2000). A sizable literature has developed on the applications of behavioral-decision theory to law. See, e.g., Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal
Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology:
A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739 (2000).
121. See, e.g., Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 2, at 419-20. The examples in the following discussion are not intended to provide an exhaustive review of fields that have raised
the consequentiality issue. For other domains, see, for example, Eva E.A. Skoe et al., The
Role of Reported Emotion in Real-Life and Hypothetical Moral Dilemmas, 28 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 962, 964 (2002).
122. For examples of the literature, see Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 2; and Kühberger et al., supra note 7.
123. See David B. Wiseman & Irwin P. Levin, Comparing Risky Decision Making Under Conditions of Real and Hypothetical Consequences, 66 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 241 (1996).
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when hypothetical consequences are used,124 and that risk-taking is
not affected at all by a consequentiality manipulation.125 In particular, in the area of Expected Utility Theory, the issue remains
whether providing people with actual rather than imagined incentives would eliminate routinely observed behaviors showing that
people fail to maximize the expected utility of their decisions. For example, research on framing effects assumes that the use of hypothetical situations adequately measures what decisions would be like
in actual situations. The classic framing task asks people to imagine,
for instance, that a disease is expected to kill 600 people.126 One
group is then asked to decide between two positively framed choices:
either saving 200 people for sure or taking a one-in-three chance of
saving all 600.127 Another group chooses between negatively framed
choices: either 400 people dying for sure or a two-in-three chance of
all 600 dying.128 In the positive-frame condition, people tend to prefer
the first (sure) choice over the latter (risky) option, whereas in the
negative-frame condition, people tend to choose the risky option over
the sure choice.129
Does this effect hold true when real consequences are at stake?
Wiseman and Levin varied risks between framed monetary gambles
and time investments that were presented first as a hypothetical decision, then later as a real decision.130 The results indicated no significant differences in participants’ decision behavior between real
and hypothetical situations;131 but because the hypothetical choices
preceded the real choices, the findings may simply be due to carryover effects, where participants might have just tried to appear consistent in their choices.132
Kühberger et al. also note that most experiments contrasting real
and hypothetical outcomes suffer from a lack of nontrivial real outcomes and that the framing effect may disappear when real and hy124. See Terence Lafferty & Kenneth L. Higbee, Realism and Risk Taking, 34
PSYCHOL. REP. 827, 827-29 (1974); Paul Slovic, Differential Effects of Real Versus Hypothetical Payoffs on Choices Among Gambles, 80 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 434, 434
(1969).
125. See Julie R. Irwin et al., Hypothetical and Real Consequences in Experimental
Auctions for Insurance Against Low-Probability Risks, 5 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 107
(1992); Paul E. Spector et al., The Effects of Real vs. Hypothetical Risk on Group ChoiceShifts, 2 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 290 (1976). This variability of empirical
findings could reflect the wide range of experimental methodologies used in psychological
research on judgment and decisionmaking. Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 2.
126. Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology
of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 453 (1981).
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id.
130. Wiseman & Levin, supra note 123.
131. Id. at 248-49.
132. Kühberger et al., supra note 7, at 1166.
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pothetical decisions with small and large payoffs are compared.133 To
test this possibility, they assigned participants to either a positive or
a negative framing condition; the participants then made both hypothetical and real decisions with both small and large payoffs. They
found that the payoff size had a significant effect, such that participants more often chose the sure option when payoffs were large
rather than small.134 They also found the expected framing-by-payoffsize interaction—with small payoffs, there was no framing effect, but
with large payoffs, the typical framing effect appeared.135 Of greatest
relevance to the present discussion, there were no observed effects
for real versus hypothetical payoffs.136 In sum, Kühberger et al. found
that when people are presented with an actual risk-decision task,
their decisions are similar to when they are presented with a hypothetical risk-decision task: risks are taken with small payoffs regardless of frame and with large payoffs when negatively framed.
So what does this mean for jury simulations? On their face, the
results of the Kühberger et al. study give some hope for the use of
jury simulation studies, in that the decision process appeared not to
depend on whether the decision task was real or hypothetical.137
However, there are several fundamental differences between the two
tasks that make the application of the results not as widely applicable as one might hope. First, there is the nature of the task. Unlike
the risk-decision studies where participants are asked to make a decision between similar monetary gambles that result in statistically
equal outcomes, juries are given the task of weighing evidence and
deciding facts in arriving at a well-reasoned decision with quite divergent alternative outcomes. Secondly, although there are consequences involved in juror decisionmaking for the jurors themselves,
the principal consequences are for the litigants in the case;138
whereas the consequences involved in making decisions about risk or
gambles will primarily (and sometimes exclusively) affect the person

133. Id.
134. Id. at 1169-70.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1169. There were also no interactions between consequentiality and the
other variables.
137. In a more extensive review of the literature, Hertwig and Ortmann reached a different conclusion, finding that although real consequences in the form of actual payments
“do not guarantee optimal decisions, in many cases they bring decisions closer to the predictions of the normative models.” Hertwig & Ortmann, supra note 2, at 395. However,
they noted the considerable variability in the effects of consequentiality across various decisionmaking contexts. Id. at 395-96. They also excluded from consideration studies in
which there was no clear standard for optimal performance; whereas in jury trials, the optimal or “correct” outcome is typically unknown. See id. See generally Colin F. Camerer &
Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1999).
138. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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making the decision. This distinction could induce different decision
processes in the two types of situations.
V. ALTERNATIVES AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Is the enterprise of studying juries through experiments absurd?
In light of the concerns presented here, are we (that is, experimental
jury researchers) wasting our time and efforts? As with virtually all
literature reviews, this one concludes that more research is needed
on real versus hypothetical jury decisions. We found only five direct
comparisons in the jury domain, and these studies produced inconsistent findings. The question has been addressed to some extent in
other areas of research, such as the broader decisionmaking literature, yet without shedding much light on the differences between
real and simulated decisionmaking in terms of either decision process or outcome. In designing such research, future scholars should
carefully consider whether consequentiality matters from a legal or a
theoretical perspective.
Most courts have demonstrated a clear reluctance to base legal
holdings on experimental research findings. Therefore, if psycholegal
researchers wish to produce legally relevant research, it seems imperative that they (that is, we) determine whether, and how, consequentiality affects juror decisions.139 The corpus of studies is as yet
insufficient to reach any definitive conclusions. Adding to this corpus
is complicated, however, by the numerous practical difficulties described in Part III of this Article. What alternatives then exist?
One alternative is to conduct research that, while not manipulating consequentiality directly, manipulates variables analogous to
consequentiality. This is the approach taken in the research on penalty severity.140 Because of the difficulties inherent in experimentally
manipulating the consequences for the litigants, another approach
would be to manipulate the consequences for the mock jurors. As described above, the notion of consequentiality subsumes the jurors as
well as the litigants. One could vary the consequences for the mock
jurors by, for example, varying their task motivation (perhaps by offering some sort of reward for good performance, such as a financial
incentive)141 or accountability for their decision.142 If such variables
139. This is by no means to suggest that psycholegal research must have legal applications for it to be worthwhile. Jury simulations can provide a useful context within which to
test psychological theories and explore fundamental processes. In such “Stage One” research, the apparent realism of the legal situation is not critical. See Diamond, supra note
4, at 563. As Diamond notes, the problem arises when one seeks to make policy recommendations from that research. Id. According to Diamond, “Stage Two” research, which more
closely approximates real legal situations, is then much more likely to be effective. Id.
140. See supra notes 109-19 and accompanying text.
141. Motivation and incentive have robust effects on behavior across a variety of domains. See, e.g., Camerer & Hogarth, supra note 137; G. Douglas Jenkins, Jr. et al., Are
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affect either the process or the outcome of mock jurors’ decisions,
then we need to be cautious about generalizing from mock jurors to
real jurors.
Another alternative is to conduct experimentation on real juries in
field settings. From a scientific perspective, there are trade-offs in
conducting field research in lieu of experimental research. Most
prominently, field research sacrifices experimental control, which is
essential for making causal inferences, and it is usually more difficult and expensive to conduct.143 Doing field research on juries carries
the additional complication that, with isolated exceptions,144 it is illegal to observe juries during deliberation; and even if deliberation is
not of primary interest, it still requires, at a minimum, the approval
of the participating judges.
Nonetheless, jury researchers have occasionally succeeded at conducting field studies. Professors Heuer and Penrod conducted several
field studies on the effects of procedural innovations such as allowing
jurors to ask questions and take notes;145 more recently, the Arizona
Jury Project addressed these and similar questions.146 In both cases,
participating judges allowed juries to be randomly assigned to different experimental conditions. Both projects have led to policy changes
being adopted by the courts.147 Calls for more field experiments on juries have been issued from prominent psychological and legal scholars.148 Because of the high external validity of field studies, their
findings are harder for courts to dismiss on methodological
Financial Incentives Related to Performance? A Meta-Analytic Review of Empirical Research, 83 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 777 (1998).
142. See generally Lerner & Tetlock, supra note 11.
143. See generally Aronson et al., supra note 2; THOMAS D. COOK & DONALD T.
CAMPBELL, QUASI-EXPERIMENTATION: DESIGN & ANALYSIS ISSUES FOR FIELD SETTINGS
(1979).
144. For example, the Arizona Jury Project collected data on deliberating juries and
tested the effectiveness of a number of procedural reforms, such as allowing jurors to discuss the case during trial. See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, The Impact of Juror Discussions During Trial: The Arizona Jury Project, Address at the American Psychology-Law
Society Meeting (Mar. 9, 2002).
145. See Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Increasing Jurors’ Participation in Trials: A
Field Experiment with Jury Notetaking and Question Asking, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231
(1988); Larry Heuer & Steven D. Penrod, Instructing Jurors: A Field Experiment with
Written and Preliminary Instructions, 13 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 409 (1989); Larry Heuer &
Steven Penrod, Juror Notetaking and Question Asking During Trials: A National Field Experiment, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1994); Larry Heuer & Steven Penrod, Trial Complexity: A Field Investigation of Its Meaning and Its Effects, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 29
(1994).
146. See supra note 144.
147. See, e.g., Leonard Post, Study Endorses Midtrial Juror Chat: Arizona’s New Rule
Is Seen as Helpful, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 19, 2004, at 1.
148. See, e.g., Paul E. Meehl, Law and the Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a
Clinical Psychologist, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY: PSYCHOLOGICAL
AND LEGAL ISSUES, supra note 4, at 10; Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A
Proposal for Restricted Field Experiments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67.
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grounds.149 As the field of jury research continues to mature, we hope
to see more of them.

149. Unless, of course, the increased external validity comes, as it sometimes does, at
the cost of decreased internal validity, in which case the field studies could simply be dismissed on other grounds. See, e.g., Aronson et al., supra note 2, at 129-33; Saks, Jury Experiments, supra note 4, at 4-9; Walker, supra note 148, at 73-74. With few exceptions,
however (for example, Free v. Peters, 12 F.3d 700 (7th Cir. 1993)), appellate courts have
tended to emphasize concerns of external validity. See, e.g., Acker, supra note 23, at 80-82;
Diamond, supra note 4, at 569; Tanford, supra note 21, at 144-48. This suggests that a
greater proportion of field experiments would substantially further the goal of getting
courts to take experimental research seriously.

